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Randall A. Terry

International Response to Transnational Terrorism

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Topic: "What is the Muslim Brotherhood? What are the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in various nations? How is America dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood?"

### Introduction

At the end of World War I, the “sick man of Europe” – the Ottoman Empire – officially died; it was laid to rest in history books and smoldering memories, its geographical remains divided by the victorious allies.

In 1924, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey abolished the Caliphate – the office of the political and religious successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad – that had ruled for nearly 1400 years in various Islamic capitols.

In 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was born.

By all accounts of academics and policy makers, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the largest non-government Islamic entities in the world, with two million members in affiliated groups, with covert and overt cells operating in over 70 countries (Emerson, 1).

Virtually every Arab Sunni Islamist and terrorist organization in the world today traces its roots, and rhetorical/ideology framework to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is – as one analyst said – the “fountainhead of all Sunni Islamist” (and terrorist) groups in the world today (Lahoud, 13, 163).

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### Historic Background

To understand the Muslim Brotherhood, one must have a rudimentary grasp of the historic and ideological narrative in which they see themselves; namely, the birth, establishment, and international spread of Islam, beginning with Muhammad . The Muslim Brotherhood – and all Islamist groups that trace their organizational and/or philosophical roots to the Muslim Brotherhood – reaches back to the dawn of Islam to frame their identity and chart their course of action. Hence, it is to that dawn that we must journey.

During Muhammad’s life, he became the spiritual, then political, then military leader of the *ummah*, the community of Muslim believers. Within his lifetime, he and his companions had successfully brought all the tribes dwelling on the entire Arabian Peninsula under Muhammad ’s – and Islam’s – rule; sometimes with preaching, more often with war, or by treaties created under the shadow of war (Mahmud, 19).

At his death, Muhammad had not appointed a successor; but it was understood that a successor with all his authority should follow him (excepting his “prophetic office,” for Muhammad claimed he was the last prophet, the “seal of the prophets”). Upon Muhammad’s demise circa 632 AD, Abu Bakr – one of Muhammad’s oldest friends, followers, as well as Muhammad’s father-in-law (father of the beautiful “child-bride,” Aisha) became Muhammad’s first “successor” (*khalifah* or *caliph* transliterated from Arabic) to lead the *ummah* (Goldschmidt, 52). Abu Bakr was followed by Umar, Uthman, then Ali.

In the Sunni framework, these four men constitute the four “rightly guided

Terry Caliphs.” However, there was a minority of Muslims who believed that a legitimate successor should be a blood relative of Muhammad in a more dynastic tradition. Ali – who was Muhammad’s cousin, and the husband of Muhammad’s daughter Fatima – was their choice. They were called the “party of Ali” – or “Shi’at Ali” in Arabic – which was shortened to “Shiites.” The Sunni position concerning succession has prevailed in the Muslim world through most of Muslim history, as well as with the majority of Muslims. There are some notable exceptions where Shiite power bases and dynasties existed, such as during the Crusade period (Goldschmidt, 82-87; Mahmud, 139-140). But for most of Islamic history, the Sunni position regarding the Caliphate has prevailed and the rift between Shiites and Sunnis has never healed, with often-bloody conflicts occurring till this day. (This paper focuses on the Sunni Islamist movement, of which the Muslim Brotherhood is the vanguard.)

The first generation of Muslims and “Companions of the Prophet” endured severe upheavals. Immediately following Muhammad’s death, most of the “believers” on the Arabian Peninsula apostatized, inducing Abu Bakr to re-conquer (militarily) the peoples who had previously sworn allegiance to Muhammad and his religion (Mahmud, 28; Goldschmidt, 52). Abu Bakr died of an illness after two years as Caliph. Fellow Muslims in turn assassinated the next three Caliphs – Umar, Uthman, and Ali – within 30 years (Mahmud, 27-42).

These internal struggles notwithstanding, Muslim generals and mujahidin lunged outside the Arabian Peninsula immediately; by the time of Ali’s death circa 661, Islamic forces had taken modern day Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and other

Terry areas of North Africa (Goldschmidt, 55). By 711 AD, almost all of the Iberian Peninsula was controlled by Muslims. Muslim armies advanced into modern France, where they were defeated in a decisive battle by “Charles the Hammer” (grandfather of Charlemagne) in 732 – at the Battle of Tours – causing them to retreat to Iberia, which they held until they were driven out centuries later. (The Byzantines held out in the rest of the empire for nearly a millennium, until the fall of Constantinople in 1453.) In the East, Muslim armies penetrated India, reaching the western borders of China (Goldschmidt, 53).

The defeat at Tours notwithstanding, the scope of Muslim expansion in speed and geography harkens to Alexander the Great for comparison, and is perhaps without parallel in history for capturing *and holding* vast populations for centuries. *The 9/11 Commission Report* notes that Muslims look back on the century after Muhammad’s death as Islam’s golden age: “What happened then – the spread of Islam from the Arabian Peninsula throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and even into Europe in less than a century seemed, and seems, miraculous” (*9/11 Report*, 50). In the Islamic scheme, these successes confirmed Muhammad’s message and mission were from God Himself; the Islamic faith and legal structure was destined by Allah to convert or rule all the nations of the earth.

The first four Caliphs ruled from the Arabian Peninsula. Over the next 1300 years, the seat(s) of Muslim power – with a continuity of Caliphs – moved to Damascus, then Baghdad, and then with (rival Caliphate) bases in Persia, Egypt, modern Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. As in the first century of the Muslim era, the Muslim empire contracted

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under siege (such as during the Crusades) and expanded during offensive wars (such as the capture of Constantinople, or the two nearly successful attempts to capture Vienna). Throughout that time, the Caliphate remained as a real (or at times symbolic) office of power in succession from Muhammad and the four “rightly guided caliphs,” until for the first time in Islamic history the Caliphate was ended after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

During one of the most disruptive times of Islamic history – when the Mongols had overrun the Empire, and then converted (in word) to Islam – a harbinger of modern Islamic terrorism emerged. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) argued that “since the Mongols continue to follow the Yasa legal code of Genghis Khan instead of the Shari’a, they were not real Muslims, but Apostates who should be punished with death according to the Shari’a” (Sageman, 9). Taymiyya’s renowned works would become part of the fabric of modern day Islamic terrorism (or *Salafi Jihad*, as it is known in academic circles) providing justification for overthrowing professing Muslim rulers who did not govern according to shari’a law, as well as foreign powers that were impediments to restoring shari’a law in Muslim lands (Sageman, 1).

The continuity of the *ummah* under one Caliph is central to Islamic political, social, and religious life and history (Goldschmidt, 106; Lahoud, 117)). When the allies defeated and dismembered the Islamic empire into nation/states and the Caliphate was ended by a “treacherous Muslim;” when Shari’a law was replaced by the dictums of western conquerors or Muslim despots, this was tantamount to the subjugation of Islam itself to infidel hoards. Centuries of often-glorious history; divine revelation issued from

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 the mouth of Allah’s prophet; sacred books with sacred commands...these do not die as easily as Empires. One must surrender one’s soul to give up the heart of one’s religion. Geopolitically, the Ottoman Empire – the last vestige of the great ummah founded by Muhammad – lay prostrate before her enemies, even within new nations that were supposedly governed by Muslims; but such a state was anathema to any truehearted Muslim, and could not long be suffered without resistance.

From the Ashes: The Birth of the Muslim Brotherhood

When studying the ideological foundations and early actions of the Muslim Brotherhood, yesteryear’s history reads like today’s headlines. Among other things, we can see that the Muslim Brotherhood has remained consistent in method and message. Its mission has been tried by fire over decades, and they have proven themselves the most major force of Islamic movements. In that light, sufficient space must be given to the Brotherhood’s founder, and its founding vision. From this root grows the tree.

In 1928, the 22-year-old Muslim watch repairer and schoolteacher – Hasan al-Banna – founded the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers in Isma’iliyya Egypt (Mitchell, 7-8). Muslim historians state that “Banna is so closely identified with the Brotherhood that its early history in his biography are almost indistinguishable” and that his influence throughout the Muslim world is so widely felt that he is “frequently characterized as the father of contemporary Islam” (Euben and Zaman, 49).

He came from a devout Sunni Muslim family; his father – Ahmad b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad – became a famous Hadith scholar later in life. His goal for his

Terry children was that they be well educated, and faithful to their Islamic heritage (Kramer, 7,8); his paternal influence over his son altered the world as we know it.

By all accounts, his first-born child – Hassan al-Banna – was a serious student; he was self-disciplined, and above all, devout in his faith. He made deliberate efforts to see the precepts of Islam enforced, even as a boy. As a 10 year old, he succeeded in having an image of “half naked lady” removed from the bow of a ship; as a teenager, he was part of a secret Muslim group that called adults to repent for their un-Islamic deeds in anonymous letters; as a college student, he would stand on chairs in coffeehouses and preach 5-10 minute sermons to customers about the beauty of the devout Islamic life (Kramer, 9, 22). Besides his mandated studies, he read extensively on his own initiative, focusing on devotional literature, biographies on Muhammad, and historic tales of heroism and defense of the homeland, “zealotry in defense of religion” and “struggle [jihad] in the path of God” (Mitchell, 4-5).

In the final years of college, he read the most renowned authors on Islamic culture, laws, and civilization; he engaged in intense – and often bitterly disappointing – discussions with the religious leaders of his day. Leaders who he deduced had lost their zeal to see God’s religion reign supreme in the world; men who had no burning desire to throw off the yoke of their colonial masters. He began to see that decisive action was necessary to save Islamic society, as well as envision his role in those actions (Mitchell, 6). Biographers record that he “exuded selfless religious devotion and unflagging energy and, by all accounts, was preternaturally gifted with remarkable personal charisma, rhetorical skill, and organizational acumen” (Euben and Zaman, 50). From the mind,

Terry heart, and energies of Hasan al-Banna – a young man barely 22 years old, who combined devotion with practical actions and achievable goals – the Muslim Brotherhood was born.

His vision for the Muslim Brotherhood was to recreate an Islamic civilization. Al-Banna chose to register the Brotherhood as a benevolent society, rather than a political party. But it was clear from his inception that he envisioned a restoration of the full political authority of Islamic law. He wrote in the early 1940s:

My brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qu’ran; when asked what it is for which you call, reply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains within it government... If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no distinction (Mitchell, 30).

#### The Growth of the Brotherhood and the Development of Jihad

The founding motto of the Muslim Brotherhood was: “God is our goal, the Qu’ran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle [*jihad*] is our way, and death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes. God is great. God is great.” (Quoted by Emerson, 2)

In the early years, al-Banna’s goal was to train young men in the true nature of Islam; to emphasize personal morality, social justice, and education in governing principles of Islam to all (Kramer, 28, 29). From the beginning, al-Banna clearly envisioned the full glory and rights of Islam to again the Islamic world, including the restoration of the Caliphate (Kramer, 23; Mitchell, 40). It was not overtly revolutionary in its immediately stated goals in the realm of geo-politics, but rather revolutionary in the interior vision of small clusters of Islamic men, with revolutionary goals. But in a few short years – simultaneously with the growth of the Brotherhood in numbers, community

Terry dealings, and political influence (or fear and suspicion) – its practical actions and goals expanded dramatically.

By the mid 1930s, they had over 100 branches in Egypt. Student Brotherhood groups were started in Universities, which also led to Brotherhood branches emerging in several Muslim nations, started by students who returned home from school (and Muslim Brotherhood training) in Cairo. In Egypt, the Brotherhood began holding large demonstrations on behalf of Arab Palestinians, and against “Zionism” (Kramer, 48). It was at that time that “national liberation, anti-imperialism in the defense of the Islamic homeland featured more prominently on the agenda” (Kramer, 29). Their vision and actions began to attract the attention of domestic and British authorities (who as yet held much power in Egypt.) One British Intelligence agent made this prophetic observation:

I consider that the “Muslim Brethren Society” will in the course of time be in a position to produce a reckless and heedless generation who will not abstain from selling their lives cheap and whose best wish would be to die as martyrs for the sake of God and their country (Kramer, 49).

His concerns were well founded. Al-Banna wrote a lengthy tract entitled *Jihad*, in which he said:

Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and the fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted similarly and who have modeled themselves upon the martyrs in their performance of jihad can join them in this reward... Their pure blood is a symbol of victory in this world and the mark of success and felicity in the world to come (al-Banna).

Tensions with the government began to rise. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood continued to grow in numbers (and influence) at a geometric rate through very difficult periods of government aggression and persecution, especially during WWII. In 1936 they had 20,000 members; by 1939, 100,000; by 1944 approaching 500,000, with some 1,500

Terry branches (Kramer, 69). The Brotherhood openly sent arms and warriors to Palestine to fight against the Jewish movement for a homeland. Al-Banna's stated vision was to re-Islamize historically Muslim nations, and then see the authority of Islam expand "to encompass the entire world" (Euben and Zaman, 62). While al-Banna's ideas were in no way new or novel – they were as old as Islam itself, and could be found in many orthodox writings from Muhammad's era to al-Banna's day – these new heralds of old ideas were not stamped out by external pressure or sudden changes in leadership, because al-Banna spent so much time developing the infrastructure of his organization. Al Banna's success "rested on three pillars: institution building, indoctrination and the cultivation of personal loyalties both horizontally and vertically" (Kramer, 37). They developed the "family system" of thousands of cells limited to five men, which were flexible, teachable, controllable, and virtually indestructible by virtue of their decentralized nature (Mitchell, 32, 33).

Lastly, they developed the "special apparatus" – a paramilitary wing – for the purpose of *jihad*. The Muslim Brotherhood's slowly built organizational structure, with mortar-like ideological and relational cohesion, ultimately withstood the efforts of British and Egyptian authorities – and the authorities in many other Islamic nations – to destroy it to this very day. The special apparatus had rigorous physical and mental training; all night prayer vigils and Qu'ran study. About 1,000 Brothers were in the special apparatus by the mid 1940's; they came to consider themselves the elite of the Brotherhood (Mitchell, 88). Regarding armed struggle for Islam, the so-called "Free Officers" were born at this time. These were military officers that were sympathizers with or members of

Terry the Muslim Brotherhood; they trained the Brotherhood's *mujahidin* in the use of arms (Mitchell, 89). Scholars acknowledge the roll of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood in the birth of the Free Officers (Lahoud, 110). Jamal Abd a-Nasir, who led the coup against the Egyptian government in 1952, and soon became President, was a key player in the Free Officers (Lahoud, 113), which had close ties to the Brotherhood at the onset of his rule. And Anwar Sadat was also an early member of the "Free Officers;" their partial ideological heirs in the Egyptian army (in a breakaway group from the Muslim Brotherhood) assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981.

Notably for this paper regarding the Brotherhood today, al-Banna stood for election on two separate occasions (Kramer, 23; Mitchell, 40). However, simultaneously with the move toward political action, in the early 1940s the Brotherhood started the "secret apparatus" (Mitchell, 32; Kramer, 70). While al-Banna was declaring publically his loyalty to the government, the secret apparatus was being designed and implemented for violent *jihad* in Egypt (Kramer, 72-73) to fight the British, to protect the Brotherhood from the government, and when needed, to advance the agenda of Islam. As we shall see, this duplicity seems woven into the very fabric of the Brotherhood to this day.

*Toward the Light: The Goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Declared to Kings*

Al-Banna believed – as Muhammad taught, and his Companions modeled – that Islam answered all questions, and gave binding direction and laws for all matters in this life; that it had a legislative aspect (shari'a) that must be obeyed and spread by Muslims from one ummah and one Caliph. In June 1947, he published *Toward the Light*, written to the King of Egypt, and sent to "Kings, princes, and rulers of the various countries of the

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Islamic world, as well as two great number of civic and religious leaders in those  
countries” (Euben and Zaman, 56).

His message was the need to rebuild Egypt and all Muslim nations from top to bottom “on the principles of Islam,” not on the tormented, wretched, greedy ideals of western nations (Euben and Zaman, 57-59). He gave a lengthy application of Islamic principles (filled with dozens of quotes from Qu’ran) regarding the Armed Forces, public health, science, morality, education, civil service, minorities, and economics. He then finished with his overarching exhortation – one that made him (and his followers) persona-non-grata in the halls of Middle Eastern power – namely, he called for an end of all political parties, the full implementation of shari’a law, training Muslim youth in Islamic Jihad, and the restoration of the Caliphate (Euben and Zaman, 74).

He ends *Toward the Light* with an offer for the Muslim Brotherhood to help achieve these goals: “We...place ourselves, our talents, and all we possess in the hands of any committee or government desirous of taking a step forward, hand in hand with an Islamic nation, toward progress and advancement. We will answer the call, and we are prepared to sacrifice ourselves” (Euben and Zaman, 78).

From a western democratic perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated goals in *Toward the Light* and many other publications to this day (Emerson) is a road map along the “Wahhabi river,” calling for the end of free speech, the end of a free press, and the end of freedom of religion; in short, the total Islamization of society according to shari’a law – complete with legal penalties for the slightest infractions.

Al-Banna’s End: Martyrdom and Immortality

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In 1948, the government of Prime Minister Nuqrashi discovered irrefutable evidence of the Muslim Brotherhood's "special apparatus" or "secret apparatus" as it is also known. The case and evidence against the Brotherhood was extensive, including killings, bomb-making, and large caches of weapons; the government case said the Brotherhood intended to "overthrow of the political order through terrorism" (Mitchell, 64). Over thirty Brothers were arrested. It was also discovered that the Brotherhood was involved in the assassination of Imam Yahya, the leader of Yemen in February 1948 (Mitchell, 72). The Egyptian government banned the Muslim Brotherhood; its assets were seized; more members were arrested.

Within two weeks, a college veterinary student turned assassin for the Muslim Brotherhood – dressed as an Egyptian officer – shot and killed Prime Minister Nuqrashi. Much of the nation was enraged; the authorities cracked down even harder. More arrests followed; while al-Banna repudiated the assassination in a pamphlet.

Another member of the Muslim Brotherhood then tried to blow up the building that housed the material evidence against the Brothers that were in custody. Again, al-Banna wrote against the attempted destruction of the evidence, saying: "They are neither Brothers, nor are they Muslims" (Mitchell, 68) This enraged many Brotherhood members, and caused Nuqrashi's assassin to lose heart; he cracked, answered questions under interrogation, and started a string of confessions.

This duplicity – the public embrace of democracy or peaceful political activism on one hand, coupled with the secret use of jihadi terrorism – is a pattern that has repeated itself with the Brotherhood until this day, as we shall prove.

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Al-Banna's repudiations notwithstanding, the government would not lift the ban on the Brotherhood. More arrests followed, but ominously, al-Banna was not arrested; he told his associates that this meant the government intended to kill him. He was right. As history shows, Egyptian authorities had him assassinated on February 12, 1949 (Euben and Zaman, 52; Mitchell, 69).

Al-Banna's assassination granted him immediate martyr status, and thereby solidified his iconic status as a guide to all modern Islamists. His writings – including *Toward the Light* – are still published and circulated by the Muslim Brotherhood.

#### Filling the Void: Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was (and remains) the next preeminent thinker and popular theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood. His works – including *Milestones* – that was written in and smuggled out of a prison cell – are foundational to the modern philosophical justification of jihadi terrorism for the extension of Islamic law (Lahoud, 116). Indeed, Muhammad Faraj – author of *The Neglected Duty* (a widely read and influential tract on the duty of immediate jihad by virtually all Muslims) and one of the assassins of Anwar Sadat – was a disciple of Qutb's teachings (Euben and Zaman, 322).

Qutb's message was simple, elegant, and demanded immediate, concrete action. His reasoning was accessible, and stayed tight to his themes. First, the whole world – including new nation-states that had once been part of the Islamic empire – had drifted into a state of “ignorance,” similar to the times before Muhammad, before the Qu'ran and shari'a (divine law) had been given to man. He repeatedly used the Qu'ranic word *jahiliyya* (ignorance, confusion) in his writings, to describe current geopolitical affairs:

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We are also surrounded by *Jahiliyyah* today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws-is *Jahiliyyah*, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of *Jahiliyyah!* (Qutb, 6)

Qutb cried out like a prophet of old: “We must also free ourselves from the clutches of *jahili* society” (Qutb, 7). It is not merely that modern western societies are confused in a philosophical sense, but they – and even so-called Muslim societies – are illegitimate in the legal and constitutional sense; “all the existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are also *jahili* societies” therefore “...all these *jahili* societies can be described in one sentence: it [Islam] considers all these societies unIslamic and illegal” (Qutb, 54, 55). The only way to be freed from *jahiliyya* is to enforce shari`a law: “The basis of the message [of Islam] is that one should accept the Shari`ah without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam” (Qutb, 18).

How, given the current confused state of affairs, are true Muslims going to bring about freedom from *jahiliyya*, and the implementation of shari`a law? Preaching is not enough: “The establishing of the dominion of God on earth, the abolishing of the dominion of man, the taking away of sovereignty from the usurper to revert it to God, and the bringing about of the enforcement of the divine Law (Shari`ah) and the abolition of man-made laws cannot be achieved only through preaching (Qutb, 33).

To break the hold of illegitimate *jahiliyya* authority – inside and outside traditionally Muslim lands – requires force, commonly known as *Jihad*. “This [Islamic] movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs and it uses physical power and *Jihad* for abolishing the organizations and authorities of

Terry the *Jahili* system... (Qutb, 33). If someone seeks to keep the message and mission of Islam from becoming a reality, “then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission” (Qutb, 34). He urged his readers to “strike hard at all those political powers” that sustain the state of ignorance. And then, “After annihilating the tyrannical force... Islam establishes a new social, economic and political system [based on shari’a law] (Qutb, 36).

Nelly Lahoud notes: “For obvious reasons, his work was interpreted by the authorities to preach a complete take-over of the whole society by the MB...” They offered him a ministerial position if he would moderate his views. He refused, and was therefore executed by hanging in 1966 (Lahoud, 115).

Like a-Banna before him, his “martyrdom” ensured his position as a legend and guide to the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as well as Islamists across the world. These two men – more than any others – have provided the philosophical underpinnings and practical agenda for Islamists and jihadists throughout Egypt and the world (Sageman, 27). As Dr. Timothy Furnish succinctly said: “al-Banna believed in working from the bottom up; Qutb from the top down.”

#### The U.S. Position and Policy Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood

The Obama administration’s posture toward the Muslim Brotherhood appears inchoate, and more recently, slightly incoherent. For example, on February 10, 2011, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence convened hearings with Intelligence heads during Egypt’s mass protests before President Mubarak’s resignation, discussing

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(among other things) the Muslim Brotherhood. James Clapper, Director of National

Intelligence, stated:

The term 'Muslim Brotherhood'...is an umbrella term for a variety of movements, in the case of Egypt, a very heterogeneous group, largely secular, which has eschewed violence and has decried Al Qaeda as a perversion of Islam. They have pursued social ends, a betterment of the political order in Egypt, et cetera...In other countries, there are also chapters or franchises of the Muslim Brotherhood, but there is no overarching agenda, particularly in pursuit of violence, at least internationally. (FOX News)

FBI Director Robert Mueller contradicted Clapper, and stated succinctly:

"Elements of the Muslim Brotherhood here and overseas have supported terrorism" (IPT News). Mueller gave further details in a closed session. A small but serious political firestorm broke out over Director Clapper's statement. House Member Sue Myrick, who was questioning Clapper, was stunned by his assertion concerning the Muslim Brotherhood. She sent out a statement later in the day, saying: "Either the Administration doesn't know who the Muslim Brotherhood is, which shows incompetence, or they are apologizing for them, which is inappropriate for those in charge of protecting the American people. Let's be clear – the Muslim Brotherhood is NOT secular." (Myrick)

On February 16, 2011, Clapper testified before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, admitting his statement about the Brotherhood was a "less than precise turn of phrase" and acknowledging that they are not secular; he also thought the Brotherhood "probably is supportive" of weapons smuggling to Hamas terrorists in Gaza (IP News).

This is an understatement. Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi, the 84-year-old head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars and chief theologian for the Brotherhood, issued

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 a fatwa deeming it a religious duty for Muslims to fight America in Iraq, and has long supported the terrorist attacks of HAMAS against Israel (Emerson, 11-12).

Within days of the assertion by Director Clapper that the Brotherhood had sworn off violence, Qaradawi issued a fatwa – live on al Jazeera TV – for Libya’s Moammar Kadafi (who had become a “partner” with America’s “war on terror) to be assassinated: "I now issue a fatwa urging officers and soldiers who can to kill Moammar Kadafi... Shoot him down and relieve the people and the country of his burden..." (Lutz).

Steven Emerson, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (July 10, 2008) was far more exacting on the details of the Brotherhood, with extensive documentation. He testified:

The Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological model for almost all modern Sunni Islamic terrorist groups. When discussing Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Richard Clarke – the chief counterterrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents Clinton and Bush – told a Senate committee in 2003 that “The common link here is the extremist Muslim Brotherhood – all of these organizations are descendants of the membership and ideology of the Muslim Brothers.” (Emerson, 4)

#### What are the Options of the United States for Dealing with the Brotherhood?

Our options are limited. “‘This is not a monolithic organization,’ CIA Director Leon Panetta told the Senate Intelligence Committee. It has lawyers and professionals among its ranks, so while ‘it is clear that within the Muslim Brotherhood there are extremist elements,’ it’s difficult to label the organization as a whole” (IPT News). If Director Panetta is correct, efforts should be made to reach out to those elements of the Brotherhood that are “moderates.” Efforts should be made to secure their help in stopping the spread of WMD into the hands of terrorists. If nothing else, lines of communication could be open to help mitigate any crisis in which U.S. citizens and interests could be

Terry protected. Meetings have been held between FBI agents and representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, to that end.

Others say that reaching out to the Brotherhood in this fashion is short-sighted and self-defeating: “Rather than countering the ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups that it has spawned, the U.S. has empowered the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, its uncompromising message by reaching out to the group itself in a poorly targeted effort to find allies in the Muslim world” (Emerson, 17).

Mr. Emerson suggested the following policy to the Senate Committee:

All organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood need to be treated for what they are: fascistic, paternalistic organizations that seek the return of the Caliphate, act as apologists for Islamism and terrorism, and are not prepared to be responsible actors in democratic systems...The Muslim Brotherhood movement should be considered a strategic enemy of the United States. It should be designated as a foreign power and a threat, from a counterintelligence point-of-view, to the national security of the United States. The Muslim Brotherhood has stated clearly that it considers the United States to be its enemy, despite claims by some commentators that there exists a moderate wing of the movement that somehow does not support the movement’s core goals and ideology (Emerson, 17).

### Concluding Observations

The resignation of Mubarak has brought a high level of interest, scrutiny, praise and accusations to the Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to his resignation, discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s connection to or avoidance of terrorism, their heroes and polemicists, their structure, and their “fountainhead” relationship to virtually every Islamist group in the world was limited primarily to academics, policy makers and analysts, and terrorist specialists in and out of government. A much larger portion of Americans than at any point in their history now knows their name.

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Many have shown that the Brotherhood is the ideological – and often relational – antecedent to al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations (Mitchell, Lahoud, Sageman). Though the charge angers leaders of the Brotherhood – for obvious political and PR reasons – it is a charge that they do not deny, but rather seek to quell or qualify. In a recent article on their official English website, the author (unnamed) bristled: “If you want to argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is an ideological predecessor to al-Qaeda, fine. You can draw a line from Sayyid Qutb's writings to modern-day salafi [terrorist] thought. But it's ridiculous to call the Brotherhood a ‘gateway’ to al-Qaeda” (Official Muslim Brotherhood Website). Ironically, the subtitle of the article was: “The Muslim Brotherhood advocates the imposition of Islamic State using political means.”

These two points are critical. First, without debate, scholars acknowledge that Muslim Brotherhood champions Hassan al-Banna and (to a greater degree) Sayyid Qutb are the ideological fountains of modern Islamic terrorism. Names in the news – as well as in huge government terrorist files – such as Muhammad Faraj (who helped assassinate Sadat, and wrote *The Neglected Duty*), Ayman Zawahiri (author of *Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet*, and number two man in al-Qaida and ideological leader), and Abu al-Zarqawi (leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, responsible for thousands of deaths before being killed in 2006) were indoctrinated by the writings of Qutb (Lahoud, 117-119).

Second, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood “*advocates the imposition of Islamic State*” is a major problem. This “imposition” – by the words of al-Banna and Qutb and a host of other polemicists – requires the political subjugation of all opposing

Terry views, and the criminal prosecution (and flogging, imprisonment, or execution) of those citizens under Islamic law who practice freedom of religion, speech, the press, etc.

The distinction made between ideological (yet primarily peaceful) Islamists and Islamic terrorists is worth making for obvious reasons. However, their end goal is the same: the imposition of a single Islamic state, ruled by a Caliph under shari'a law (Lahoud, 1-13). That being true, in some ways, it is simply a matter of discussing how, when, where, and by whom "the sword of Islam" will be used for the imposition of Islamic law.

Whether Islamic shari'a law comes through terrorism or "democracy," human rights and freedoms as defined in the Judeo-Christian west, and delineated in several U.N. treaties on fundamental human rights, would be crushed.

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